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Abstract  
This paper presents a novel approach to measure efficiency and productivity decomposition 
in the banking systems of emerging economies with a special focus on the role of equity 
capital. We model the requirement to hold levels of a fixed input, i.e. equity, above the long 
run equilibrium level or, alternatively, to achieve a target equity-asset ratio. To capture the 
effect of this under-leveraging, we allow the banking system to operate in an uneconomic 
region of the technology. Productivity decomposition is developed to include exogenous 
factors such as policy constraints. We use a panel data set of banks in emerging economies 
during the financial upheaval period of 2005–2008 to analyse these ideas. Results indicate the 
importance of the capital constraint in the decomposition of productivity. 
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How regulatory capital requirement affects banks’ productivity: An application 
on emerging economies banks 
1.! Introduction 
When a banking system has undergone a financial shock, there are important lessons to 
learn from how it reacts, adapts and recovers. These lessons had particularly strong policy 
implications when most of the developed world was recovering from the financial crisis of 
2007–2008. Many emerging economies, however, experienced a number of shocks before 
this and some began to recover ahead of the developed economies. As a consequence, 
considerable lessons can be learned from the emerging economies during the last decade 
about financial liberalization, banking system recapitalization and financial crises.  
Banking system recapitalization, that is, a greater reliance on equity capital rather than 
short-term borrowing as a means of providing full loss absorbing capacity for problem loans 
is a major preoccupation of policymakers around the world. It is widely believed that a well-
capitalized banking system is expected to be less vulnerable to financial crises, whereas an 
inadequately capitalized banking system is more susceptible to financial shocks!
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al., 2009). Major recapitalization of the banking systems 
mandated by regulators’ requirements, could, however, impose a resource cost both on the 
wider economy and on the banking system in particular (Daniel and Jones, 2007)1.  
Our paper attempts to measure this cost and its impact on the banking system. One focus 
of the research, therefore, will be on measuring the shadow return on equity associated with 
                                                
1 In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, this issue has preoccupied regulators; a member of the US 
Senate Banking Committee asks: “What is the true cost to national economies of higher capital requirements for 
banks?” Senator Kay Hargan, letter to The Economist, June 4, 2010. 
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regulatory capital constraints on the bank balance sheets2. A related question is how has the 
upheaval in financial markets affected the efficiency and productivity change of banking 
systems during this period? This paper fills a gap in the literature by departing from the 
traditional analysis of efficiency and productivity by incorporating regulatory constraints into 
the cost function. We argue that the regulatory capital constraint is a critical aspect to be 
considered when modelling a banking system’s cost-minimizing behaviour in order to 
measure productivity. These ideas are soundly established in the theoretical literature but we 
wish to develop this theoretical framework into an empirical application. In particular, we 
aim to measure the productivity cost of changes in the regulatory capital requirements of 
banks and to relate this to the empirical measurement of the shadow price of equity capital 
over time and amongst groups of emerging economies. 
There is a vast amount of literature on bank efficiency and productivity that examines a 
number of aspects such as investigating the determinants of efficiency (Canhato and 
Dermine, 2003; Casu and Molyneux, 2003); ownership (Havrylchyk, 2006; Sturm and 
Williams, 2004); stock returns and efficiency (Beccalli et al., 2006; Erdem and Erdem, 2008); 
corporate events and efficiency (Avkiran, 1999; Sherman and Rupert, 2006); regulatory 
reform, liberalization and efficiency (Brissimis et al., 2008; Fethi et al, 2011; Isik and 
Hassan, 2003; Tsionas et al., 2003); consolidation and its impact on banks’ efficiency (Cuesta 
and Orea, 2002; Vivas et al. 2011); and comparison of different frontier techniques (Delis et 
al., 2009)3. However, to our knowledge, there is an insufficient number of studies that 
formally consider the relationship between banks’ regulated capital and productivity (Fethi et 
al., 2012).  
                                                
2 This shadow return is calculated from the negative of the elasticity of a bank’s cost function with respect to the 
level of equity capital, as shown later in the paper. 
3 Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) present detailed reviews of the literature on 
banking efficiency. 
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Our paper provides a new direction in the efficiency and productivity literature by 
exploiting a theoretical feature long overlooked empirically in this strand. The novelty of this 
paper is owed to constructing a modelling framework that accounts for the impact of the 
regulatory capital constraint on banking production costs. We relax the underlying 
assumption of the long run cost function by exploiting the envelopment theory and 
introducing a proxy of capital that is subject to short-run adjustment into the cost function. 
Our proposed approach is then utilized to obtain the efficiency and productivity 
decomposition in the banking systems of emerging economies. We further extend the 
analysis by reflecting our proposed model on the specification of composed error stochastic 
frontier analysis to derive a productivity decomposition for a panel data set of emerging 
economy banking systems, where the decomposition includes the impact of the capital 
constraint. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and the 
proposed model whilst Section 3 introduces the model specification and data. Section 4 
provides analytical discussions on the empirical findings; and the final section concludes.  
 
 
2.! Alternative modelling for the technology and relative efficiency 
In this section, we develop a model of banking system activity that takes account of the 
equity capital requirements. In particular, we look at how the increased capital requirements 
(compulsory by regulators) may impose additional costs on the efficient allocation of 
resources. We begin with the parametric frontier dual-cost function, which is based on K  
variable inputs: ( )
K
x,,x !
1
=x  with input prices: ( )
K
w,,w !
1
=w  and R outputs: 
( )Ry,,y !1=y , and an additional input. This input may be either fixed in the short run, or 
required in a fixed ratio to output, but is variable in the long run. To further clarify, we 
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symbolize this particular input as 
0
z , with input price 
0
w . We argue that the interpretation of 
this fixed input will be critical in a banking industry paradigm, hence it captures the 
importance of the equity capital level.  
We formalize our hypothesis based on the arguments introduced by Braeutigam and 
Daughety (1983) and Hughes et al. (2001), and we write the long run cost function, with all 
inputs including 
0
z treated as variable, in the form: 
( ) ( ){ }0,,:min,, 000
,
0
0
=+′= tzFzwtwc
z
yx,xwwy,
x
                  [1] 
The efficient boundary of the technology set is represented by a transformation function: 
( ) 0,,
0
=tzF yx, . Assuming weak disposability of the technology implies that the first 
derivatives, 
kk
xFF ∂∂≡ , 
rr yFF ∂∂≡ , are not restricted in sign. This will allow the model 
to accommodate both positive and negative shadow prices in the dual-cost function. In that 
vein, for a banking industry the regulated short run cost function can be modelled in two 
ways: either by specifying a fixed level of the critical input equity capital, 
0
z  is fixed; or 
alternatively, by specifying a fixed ratio of the critical input equity capital to a single 
dimension of output measured as total assets, yzzr
000
=′= yi . Most of the literature tends 
to perceive this feature of the envelope theorem application to banking costs through the short 
run cost function with a fixed equity level. However, we opt to show the relationship between 
the long run total cost and the short run total cost expressed in regulated equity-asset ratio 
form. In this case, where the equity capital input 
0
z  must be held in a regulated or target ratio 
with output measured as total assets, 
0
r , the short run cost function is: 
( ) ( ){ }yrrztzFzwzwtrc 000000000 ;0,,:min,, =′==+′=+ yiyx,xwwy,
x
                 [2] 
The envelope theorem confirms that long run total cost defines the envelope of short run total 
cost: 
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( ) ( ){ }
0000 ,,min,,
0
zwtrctwc
z
+= wy,wy,                    [3] 
Consequently, the following derivative result holds in the neighbourhood of the optimal ratio 
of the fixed input, yrz
00
= : 
( ) ( )[ ] ywrtrcrtwc
00000
*,,0,, +∂∂==∂∂ wy,wy,                   [4] 
Rearranging this last result and expressing it in elasticity form gives the critical interpretation 
of the shadow price of the target equity capital ratio: 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )CzwCrywrtrc
000000
ln*,,ln ==∂∂− wy,                   [5] 
 
In other words, the negative log derivative of the short run cost function expresses the 
shadow share of equity costs to total expenses4.  
There are two particularly important implications in the analysis of banking systems, and 
these concern the measurement of the shadow price away from equilibrium and the 
measurement of returns to scale. These implications depend on the nature or choice of the 
fixed input, either the level of equity capital or equity capital expressed as a ratio to total 
assets (equity-asset). In the first case when equity level is involved, we interpret that the 
negative of the derivative of short run total cost with respect to the equity level is the shadow 
cost of equity. The second case is when the model involves the equity-asset ratio. In that case 
we interpret the negative of the derivative of short run total cost with respect to the equity-
asset ratio as the shadow ratio of equity expenses to total expenses. 
In our case, the inclusion of the equity-asset or capital ratio as an explanatory variable in 
the cost function enables us to examine three possible outcomes that will consequently affect 
the cost in our model. First, “Over Leverage”: banks that are over-leveraged or reliant on debt 
and under-use equity capital can be expected to show a relatively low ratio of equity expenses 
                                                
4 In the case where a fixed level of input is the constraint, the corresponding result is that the negative of the 
derivative of the variable cost function with respect to this fixed input is the input’s shadow price. 
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to total expenses (but with a negative sign on the measured elasticity in the cost function – 
see equation [5] above). These banks might be engaged in capitalizing themselves, however, 
with insignificant proportions or relatively very low rates either due to high competition, 
lucrative opportunities in the loans market, or simply weak accessibility to equity capital. 
Second, “Active-Capitalizer” banks that are engaged in active recapitalization will show a 
relatively high ratio of equity expenses to total expenses, but still with a negative sign in [5]. 
(These types of banks tend to constantly adjust their equity levels to meet the regulatory 
requirements.) Third, “Excessive-Capitalizer” banks that are far from long run cost 
minimizing equilibrium, for example because they are undergoing major recapitalization with 
current equity capital levels well above the long run equilibrium and may be expected to 
show a significant rise in the ratio of equity expenses to total expenses compared with the 
long run average when the fitted cost function includes the equity-asset ratio. In the third 
case, for instance where the fitted cost function is conditioned on the level of equity capital 
instead of the equity-asset ratio, we will observe a very low possibly severely negative 
shadow return on equity in the recovery phase from financial crisis. Negative values of the 
shadow input price or return on the fixed input equity level (corresponding to above average 
ratio of equity to total expenses) would arise if, for example, the firm was operating in the 
uneconomic region of the production function. Such “Excessive-Capitalizer” banks most 
often appear when the banking system is mandated to re-capitalize following a financial 
crisis5 – a classic example of this regulatory imposition of re-capitalization was the IMF-
mandated re-organization of the Turkish banking system after 2001 when the regulatory 
capital requirement was set at 25 percent of total assets, at a time when many European banks 
were operating with less than 3 percent equity-assets ratios, see Fethi et al (2012).  
                                                
5 We are grateful to a reviewer for emphasizing the distinction between regulatory capital requirements and real 
balance sheet constraints 
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The sign and magnitude of the shadow return for the equity-asset ratio indeed have an 
implication on the measurement of returns to scale. Panzar and Willig (1977) derive the 
following result concerning the inverse of the elasticity of cost with respect to output: 
( )( ) ( )∑∑
=
=
=
=
− ∂∂=∂∂=
Rr
r
r
Rr
r
rrc ycycycE
11
1
lnln1
y
                  [6] 
Then 1
1
<
−
yc
E  implies diseconomies of scale (decreasing returns), 1
1
=
−
yc
E  implies constant 
returns to scale and 1
1
>
−
yc
E  implies economies of scale (increasing returns). The definition of 
cost used here, however, is the long run total cost: ( )twc ,,
0
wy, , but as Braeutigam and 
Daughety (1983) demonstrate, close to the optimum level of the fixed input, the short run 
total cost can be used instead. The elasticity of scale is measured by adjusting the long run 
Panzar-Willig estimate by the shadow ratio of equity expenses to total expenses: 
( ) ( )∑
=
=
− ∂∂∂∂−≈
Rr
r
rc yCrCE
1
0
1
lnlnlnln1
y
                   [7] 
This measures returns to scale at the observed suboptimal level of the fixed input, which may 
be more appropriate if the industry is expected to remain at a suboptimal allocation of inputs.  
We therefore have two possible specifications of the short run total cost function, one 
using the equity-asset ratio and one using the equity level. We proceed at this point using the 
equity-asset ratio, but both forms are fitted in the estimation results. The actual cost 
experienced by the firm is by definition: 
0
α+′≡ xw
t
C  where 
0
α  is expenditure on the fixed 
input. Consequently, cost efficiency at time t is: 
( ){ } ( ]1,0,,
0
∈=
tt
CtrcCE wy,                     [8] 
Using ( ) 0,exp ≥− uu  to transform the measure of cost efficiency from the interval ( ]1,0  into 
a non-negative random variable with support on the non-negative real line [ )+∞,0  yields: 
( ) utrcC
t
+= ,,lnln
0
wy,                            [9] 
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This function should be homogeneous of degree +1 and concave in input prices. An 
econometric approach may be adopted by replacing the deterministic kernel of [13] with a 
fully flexible functional form such as the translog function with an additive idiosyncratic 
error term v  to capture sampling, measurement and specification error. We impose 
homogeneity by dividing through by one of the input prices, for example 
K
w , expressing the 
variables in vector form as: 
( ) ( )( )
( )R
KKK
ylnyln
wwlnwwln~
!
!
1
11
=
= −
ly
wl
 
and writing the translog approximation with additive error term as ( ) vtrTL +,,~
0
wy, . In the 
equity-asset ratio specification, these steps give us the following result: 
( )
( ) uvtrrrrr
ttttwC
K
+++′+′+++
′+′+++′+′+′+′+′+=
000
2
022
1
01
2
22
1
12
1
2
1
0
lnln
~
lnlnln
~~~~~
ln
ωρρ
δδα
wlξlyθ
wlηlyµwlΓylwlΒwllyΑylwlβlyα
                                 [10] 
The vectors of elasticity functions (equivalent in the case of the input prices to the share 
equations by Shephard’s lemma) are derived by differentiating the translog quadratic form: 




























′′
′′
′
=












0
21
21
0
~
ln
~
1
r
t
w
r
t
w
y
l
ly
ξθ
ηµ
ξηΒΓβ
θµΓΑα
ε
ε
ρωρ
ωδδ
ε
ε
! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!! ∀11#!
This matrix derivative of the translog short run cost function can be used to generate a total 
factor productivity decomposition. 
 
2.1.! Productivity growth decomposition 
We derive the total factor productivity index and its decomposition as follows (see 
Bauer, 1990; Orea, 2002). Differentiating both sides of the cost equation [10] with respect to t 
and rearranging the result, we obtain: 
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( ) ( ) ( )
00
1
1 rdtduEEE rtwyy !!!!! εε −−−
′
−+′−=′−′− wεsyεxsyε                               [12] 
In this expression, 1−E is the elasticity of scale; yε is the vector of cost elasticity functions 
with respect to the outputs, with typical element: ( )
ryr
ytrc ln,,ln 0 ∂∂= wy,ε ; wε is the 
vector of cost elasticity functions with respect to the input prices, with typical element: 
( )
kwk
wtrc ln,,ln
0
∂∂= wy,ε ; 
t
ε is the cost elasticity function with respect to the time-based 
index of technological progress: ( ) ttrc
t
∂∂= ,,ln 0wy,ε ; ( )dtdu  is the rate of change of 
inefficiency; and finally, 
0r
ε  is the cost elasticity with respect to the target equity-asset ratio 
constraint. The left-hand side of this expression is by definition a measure of total factor 
productivity change with weights that sum to unity, that is, by construction in the case of 
outputs and by linear homogeneity in the case of inputs. Hence, the right-hand side is a 
complete decomposition of the total factor productivity index. 
The five components of the total factor productivity change on the right-hand side of the 
equation can therefore be interpreted as follows: 
(a)! ( ) yε !yEE ′−1 : scale efficiency change; if 1=E  i.e. CRS, there is zero scale efficiency 
change in the total factor productivity change, TFPC, decomposition. 
(b)! ( ) wεs !′−
w
: allocative efficiency change; if actual input cost shares and optimal input 
cost shares are equal, there is no potential for allocative efficiency change 0εs =−
w
. 
(c)!
t
ε− : technological change; if the elasticity of cost with respect to time as a proxy for 
the technological change is negative, 0<
t
ε , then this term will raise productivity. 
(d)! ( )dtdu− : cost efficiency change; if this term, including the sign, is positive then 
productivity is enhanced by improvements in the technology. 
(e)!
00
r
r
!ε : regulated equity-asset ratio productivity change; if this term, including the 
sign, is positive then productivity is enhanced by relaxation of the equity-asset ratio 
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constraint, and conversely productivity is reduced when the constraint becomes more 
strongly binding, for example in a recapitalization phase. 
It is the last component that allows us to compute the first order cost of recapitalizing the 
banking system. If the shadow price or rate of return on equity is positive, then holding 
higher levels of equity capital or a higher target equity-asset ratio will move the banking 
system towards a long run equilibrium and will generate a positive impact on productivity 
growth.  
However, if the shadow price or rate of return on equity is negative (i.e. the equity level 
has a positive coefficient in the fitted cost function), or there is a requirement to hold higher 
than equilibrium levels of equity capital relative to assets, then this will impose a negative 
component on productivity growth. The negative shadow rate of return on equity capital is 
the first order indicator that the bank is an excessive captalizer in the term introduced earlier. 
This allows us to measure the cost impact of recapitalization by the contribution (negative or 
positive) of the changes in the equity level or the equity-asset ratio to the measured total 
factor productivity growth. There is a further potential second order effect in that the 
imposition of policy determined additional equity capital requirements may have a knock-on 
effect on the allocative efficiency component. Even where positive allocative efficiency is 
achieved this may be mitigated by the additional regulatory requirements. 
The components of total factor productivity change, PFT ! , are shown in total differential 
form; however, we can use them in index number form, as follows: 
(a)! ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]( )∑ −−+− ++++
r
rtrt
t
yrt
tt
yrt
t
yyEEEE lnln11
1
1
1
1
2
1 εε  is the effect of scale 
efficiency change. 
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(b)! ( ) ( )[ ]( )∑ −−+− +++
k
ktktwktktwktkt
wwss lnln
1112
1 εε  is the effect of the bias in using 
actual cost share weights instead of optimal cost shares based on shadow prices, i.e. 
allocative efficiency change. 
(c)! ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ttzcttzc ∂∂+∂+∂−
002
1 ,ln1,,ln wy,wy,  is the effect of cost reducing 
technical progress. 
(d)! [ ]
tt
CECE −+1  is cost efficiency change. 
(e)! [ ]( )
tttrtr
rr
0100102
1 lnln −+− ++ εε  is the effect on productivity change of variation in the 
equity-asset ratio constraint. 
 
 
3.! Methodology and data 
The stochastic frontier analysis regression to be estimated, with the error components v  
representing idiosyncratic error and u representing inefficiency, can be expressed succinctly 
as follows: 
 
( ) TtNiuvwC
itititititK
!! 1,1;ln 0 ==+=+′+= εεα θx it                          [13] 
Here 
it
x′  is a ( )2++ RK  vector of explanatory variables representing the input prices, 
outputs, time and the level of the fixed input equity capital including second order direct and 
cross product translog expressions. The range of panel data stochastic frontier analysis 
models reflects different assumptions about the nature of the composed error terms. Because 
experience suggests that parameter values can be sensitive to the form of the stochastic 
frontier analysis model that is fitted, we shall use a number of different types of these models. 
The literature here is immense but we can summarize it briefly as follows. 
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Within the strict panel data structure, many researchers have followed Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) and Pitt and Lee (1981) in adopting a time-invariant model of inefficiency 
with a short panel; therefore the composed error term is written as: 
iitit
uv +=ε . The model 
can be estimated by standard fixed effects using dummy variables (FE-LSDV), standard 
random effects with generalized least squares (RE-GLS), or by random effects maximum 
likelihood estimation (RE-MLE), as suggested by Pitt and Lee, if specific distributional 
assumptions are made, for example the truncated-normal distribution for the inefficiency 
term.  
The RE-GLS and RE-MLE models usually provide very similar results. To incorporate 
the more general assumption of time-varying inefficiency, two broad approaches are possible. 
The inefficiency component can be made an explicit function of time: ( )thuu
iit
= . Battese 
and Coelli (1992) use an exponential function which is the same across all producers and can 
be estimated by maximum likelihood with the appropriate distributional assumptions. These 
methods retain an explicit panel structure.  
Firm specific heterogeneity may be incorporated through additional conditioning 
variables, and a pooled estimation technique based on some form of modified least squares 
could also be adopted. For example, by making use of the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator based on generalized least squares SURE-GLS, we can obtain estimators which are 
relatively efficient and permit the error terms in the cost share equations to be related to the 
overall cost equation. This is a generalization which standard stochastic frontier analysis 
estimators are unable to provide (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000: 156-8).  
Finally, Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), amongst others, suggested the strategy of 
making specific parameters of the inefficiency density function for 
it
u  conditional on time-
varying exogenous variables (i.e. conditional mean or conditional heteroscedasticity). 
Numerous other models in the literature develop variants of these general procedures; for 
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example, the “thick frontier” approach of Berger and Humphrey (1991) splits the sample into 
quantiles of the dependent variable and estimates average regressions for each quantile; the 
distribution-free approach of Berger (1993), which is similar in concept to RE-GLS, uses 
seemingly unrelated regression with generalized least squares (SURE-GLS) applied to each 
time period separately. Reflecting this discussion, the empirical results in this paper are 
derived from five broad categories of model. These are summarized in the Appendix table of 
composed error specifications. 
 
 
3.1.!Data 
The data are gathered from several major sources: Bankscope by Bureau van Dijk 
(2010), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World 
Bank databases. The bank data have been reported in $US millions at current prices and 
market exchange rates. We convert to constant price (year 2000) values by deflating the $US 
denominated data converted at market exchange rates by the US GDP deflator. Table 1 
reports the range of countries and regions used in the sample, while summary statistics for 
our sample of 485 banks over the period 2005–2008 are reported in Table 2; these indicate 
the within sample variability of the pre-filtered raw data. Prior to data filtering we selected a 
balanced panel comprising the largest commercial banks within each country so that no 
country has fewer than 6 observations per year of the sample. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
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The definitions of the key variables in the cost function are standard in the current 
literature on bank performance (e.g., Bikker and Bos, 2008). They are calculated from the 
constant price data as follows. Cost, C, is the total cost, that is, the sum of interest expenses, 
salaries and employee benefits and other operating costs. Outputs are: loans, y1, securities 
investments, y2, and off balance sheet total business volume, y3. The loans variable used is net 
loans after allocating reserves for non-performing loans (NPLs). Equity capital (z0) is 
reported separately in the Bankscope data base. On average,  banks in the sample held equity 
capital ratios of about 11 percent of total assets at this time – this not only met Basel 
requirements but also exceeded ratios typically held in the EU and other developed 
economies in the lead up to the financial crisis. The first two outputs, loans, y1, securities 
investments, y2, together account for total assets, (z1). Input price indices are: the price of 
labour, w1, computed as salaries and employee benefits relative to total assets, the price of 
physical capital, computed as other operating expenses divided by fixed assets, w2, and the 
price of funds, computed as interest expenses relative to deposits and short term funding, w3. 
All of these industry variables are sourced from Bureau van Dijk (2010) for each bank and 
period in the sample, and all have been deflated as above. In addition to these key variables, 
banking system variables are used along with macroeconomic variables to condition the 
individual bank cost functions.  
Macroeconomic variables are collected from the OECD and World Bank databases and 
vary through time but are constant across banks. They are measured as percentage rates of 
change. In this way the banking market is conditioned at the level of the macroeconomy 
before the beginning of the sample period; then the relative changes in the macroeconomic 
environment are treated as exogenous shocks. They are measured in differenced form to 
avoid the spurious correlation problem of entering macroeconomic trending variables in the 
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cost regression. The macroeconomic environmental shocks used in the analysis are as 
follows: 
(a)!change in gross domestic product (GDP) at 2000 market prices; 
(b)!change in GDP at 2000 market prices per head of population. 
These reflect the cyclical response to government macroeconomic policy as well as the 
impact of exogenous shocks from the external economy. 
The banking system variables that can be derived from Bankscope for the emerging 
banks in the sample include: Loan loss reserve/Gross loans, Net interest margin, Return on 
assets, Return on equity, Cost to income ratio, Net loans/Total assets, Net loans/Customer 
and short term, Funding reserves for impaired loans/NPLs, Non-interest income/Gross 
revenues, Non-interest expense/Gross expenses, NPL/Gross loans, Reserves for NPL/Gross 
loans, Reserves for NPL/NPL, and Interbank assets/Interbank liabilities.  
All of the data in the fitted regressions are log-mean-corrected, that is, expressed as 
deviations from the sample means after having been transformed to natural logarithms. This 
has three advantages: it ensures that the translog function which is an approximation to an 
arbitrary second order function has the point of approximation at the sample mean; it allows 
us to check the properties of the fitted translog function at the sample mean by examining the 
first order estimated coefficients; and it enables computation of the variance of linear 
functions of the estimated coefficients around the sample mean from the variance-covariance 
matrix of the regression coefficients. Finally, prior to estimation of the models, the data were 
filtered using the financial ratio rules suggested by Bikker and Bos (2008) together with the 
addition of a statistical criterion in which we estimated a simple pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) translog model for the whole sample and dropped observations with a standardized 
OLS residual exceeding 2 in absolute value. This statistical rule of thumb is approximately 
equivalent to capturing outliers in the data by an instrumental dummy variable at the 5 
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percent level of significance. We refer the reader to Bikker and Bos (2008: 61-2, Table 9.2) 
for a full discussion of data-filtering rules using international banking data. The purpose of 
the rule-based filtering is to eliminate banks operating in special circumstances or with 
obviously erroneous data and with abnormal ratios between key variables6.  These rule based 
and regression based filters resulted in reducing the sample from 1940 observations to 1786 
observations so that 8 percent of the initial balanced sample was filtered out by the 
combination of the rules and the standardized residual test7.  
After the filtering, all of the original countries remain in the sample in every year of the 
panel, and all of the geographical regions are represented in more or less the same 
proportions, although the data for South America are reduced slightly more than the others 
because of the impact on Brazil. Therefore we can confirm the stability of the sampled data 
set in terms of selected banks. In each country except one the filtering rules left at least 87 
percent of the sample remaining after applying the filtering tests. The exception is Brazil for 
which the tests deselected 44 percent of the initial balanced sample; nevertheless, even after 
filtering, Brazil remains the second largest contributor to the sample accounting for 6 percent 
of the observations.  
 
4.! Empirical results: parameter estimates and the shadow price of the equity-asset 
ratio  
Regression results for the first order coefficients in the cost function fitted under 
different models are shown in Table 3, which presents: (i) the monotonicity effects, that is, 
                                                
6 We made an exception to the Bikker and Bos filtering rules. We adjusted the permitted upper bound of the 
equity asset ratio to 90 percent if the observation simultaneously passed the regression standardised residual test 
– we did so because this variable is a key aspect of our analysis. This resulted in keeping in the sample 14 
observations (0.8 percent of the sample), chiefly of banks in South America, that the rule based criterion would 
have deselected.  
 
7 The statistical standardised residual test has more impact on the sample selected than the rule based approach. 
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elasticity function estimates at the sample mean, and (ii) measures of the presence of 
inefficiency as a component of the error term and whether the inefficiency is time varying. 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
The regression coefficients on the first order terms8, that is, the cost function elasticities 
at the sample mean, are relatively consistent across the different econometric specifications. 
The models all fit well and there are no strong reasons to favour one over another. However, 
the SURE-GLS model which pools the data without a panel structure finds a negative effect 
from securities investment while at the same time suggesting that the shadow price of the 
equity-asset ratio constraint is higher than for other models and therefore we drop this model 
from the reported results. The four  stochastic frontier analysis models all find a very 
consistent and statistically significant negative cost elasticity of -4.1 to -4.9 percent on the 
capital constraint at the sample mean. Using the envelope theorem result in equation [5] 
above, this elasticity estimate is the negative of the shadow price of capital consequently we 
can see that the regulatory requirement to hold equity capital as a proportion of total assets is 
a strongly binding constraint at the sample mean. Applying matrix equation [11] to the whole 
sample makes it possible to determine the impact of this constraint at every sample point, and 
this is what emerges from the subsequent productivity change decomposition. At some 
sample points this elasticity function in the last row of matrix equation [11] turns positive 
indicating that we have identified an “Excessive Capitalizer” operating in the uneconomic 
region of the banking production function because it is having to achieve a much higher 
equity capital to assets ratio. It is at these sample points where the capital constraint will have 
a negative impact on productivity change, and they are identified in the subsequent analysis 
of the productivity change decomposition.   
                                                
8 There are multiple second order and interaction coefficients too numerous to report here. 
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Amongst the four stochastic frontier analysis models the Reifschneider-Stevenson (1991) 
results indicate the significance of all of the output variables and have significant and 
theoretically correct first order elasticity estimates at the sample mean. 
Each of the final banking system variables is statistically significant in at least one of the 
estimated models. The reported results indicate that the significant banking system variables 
fall into three types: loans relative to measures of scale with a higher ratio having negative 
cost elasticity, liquidity ratio again with negative elasticity and non-performing loans ratios 
relative to the average for the country.  
 
The Panzar-Willig estimate of the elasticity of scale at the sample mean and the scale 
elasticity evaluated out of equilibrium, after adjusting for the regulated equity-assets ratio, are 
shown in Table 4; they indicate a small degree of increasing returns suggesting scope for 
some consolidation amongst the banking systems in emerging economies. 
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
!
4.1.!Empirical results: productivity measurement 
In this section of the paper, we use the discrete index number calculation to decompose 
productivity change during the period encompassing the financial crisis. We could illustrate 
the impact by using any of the four composed error stochastic frontier analysis models since 
their coefficients are relatively stable across different approaches. For a number of reasons 
described above, the Reifschneider-Stevenson model seems to generate the most sensible 
results and we focus on that model to calculate the productivity decomposition. It is 
important to distinguish the interpretation of the productivity change components from that of 
the regression coefficients. As we see from Table 3, the models are all well-determined and 
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the coefficients estimated with high precision; these strongly significant coefficients are then 
used through matrix equation [11] to generate the productivity components, but it is not 
possible to attach statistical significance to the numerically derived productivity change 
components in Tables 5 and 6 below. The essential point is that the productivity change 
estimates are derived from a regression model estimated with a high degree of precision and 
statistical significance, but the productivity change components are numerically derived by 
the application of matrix equation [11] and do not have corresponding standard errors. The 
numerical impacts are expressed as decimal fractions so that for example an impact of -0.006 
is equivalent to a decline of more than half of one percent in the rate of annual productivity 
change , which by conventional measures is a substantial impact. 
 
Table 5 reports the productivity estimates and the component factors for this model; the 
decomposition covers scale efficiency change, technical change, efficiency change, allocative 
efficiency change, and constraint relaxation change. The last component illustrates how an 
enhanced  regulatory requirement to build up a stronger equity-asset ratio during 
recapitalization may enhance or offset total factor productivity change over the period. 
<TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
In Table 5 we see that total factor productivity change in emerging economy banking 
systems averaged over the sample period has been very slightly negative. The forces driving 
total factor productivity up have originated in scale efficiency change and allocative 
efficiency change. Regressive factors have been an apparent loss of technological progress 
and the impact of the equity-asset constraint. In other words, the need to maintain a certain 
level of capital has offset the positive forces on total factor productivity change during this 
critical period. Consistently over the period allocative and scale efficiency change have 
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contributed positively to the performance of banking systems in transition economies. 
Efficiency change has improved after an initial negative start. Consequently the emerging 
economies’ banking systems have shown signs of resilience while the international financial 
system has been coping with its recent problems. However, cost performance has been 
weakened by a failure to take advantage of technological progress and by the need to 
maintain acceptable equity capital ratios. The capital adequacy constraint has contributed to 
the weak overall productivity performance. 
These results can be seen in more detail when we disaggregate by country groupings in 
Table 6 to obtain the average productivity change components over time. 
<TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
The impact of the capital constraint has been particularly strong for the Middle East 
(ME) and South East Asia (SEA). The deleveraging implied by a more strongly binding 
capital constraint and the consequent fact that the shadow return on equity turned negative for 
these regions has meant that the impact on total factor productivity has been regressive (the 
growth factor is below one). This allows us to say that this modelling approach provides a 
direct estimate of the productivity cost of constrained deleveraging activity arising from 
policy decisions. A key to understanding this effect is that it is regulatory requirements that 
conventionally drive re-capitalization activity, and therefore there is an interaction with the 
ability to generate productivity change through allocative efficiency gains so that enhanced 
regulatory requirements may have a second order indirect effect in mitigating the 
achievement of allocative efficiency improvement9. 
  
 
                                                
9 We acknowledge the suggestion of a reviewer in this comment. 
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5.! Conclusions and policy lessons 
We have carried out an empirical analysis of the banking systems of a large number of 
emerging economies during a critical period for the international financial system. In doing 
this we focused on three aspects of the modelling problem. First, we chose to construct short 
run regulatory constrained total cost functions for the emerging economy banks. The 
regulatory constraint arises from equity-capital requirements imposed on the balance sheet. 
Second, we applied stochastic frontier analysis to these in order to identify sources of 
variability in economic performance. Third, we were able to derive from the estimated cost 
functions a decomposition of total factor productivity into: scale efficiency change, allocative 
efficiency change, technical change, efficiency change and the impact of the equity capital 
constraint.  
We discovered that a variety of time-invariant and time-varying stochastic frontier 
analysis models produced consistent results for this sample period, but we were able to show 
that a time varying conditional heteroscedasticity model fitted the data particularly well. 
Amongst the empirical results that we were able to uncover, we confirm the importance of 
the regulated equity capital ratio as a constraint on cost minimizing behaviour. This has 
important policy implications. In the current state of worldwide recovery from the financial 
crisis, the issue of the recapitalization of the banking system is dominating the policy debate. 
This has a long run dimension, which is expressed in the question of whether greater reliance 
on equity capital will raise the long run funding costs of the banks. Policymakers seem 
relatively optimistic on this issue. However, the equity capital ratio also has a short run 
dimension: what are the adjustment costs that arise when a banking system recapitalizes? As 
we indicated at the beginning of the paper, this is an important and unresolved policy 
problem. This paper has suggested a way of measuring these adjustment costs by examining 
the role of the equity capital constraint in the determination of total factor productivity of the 
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banking system. Our results suggest that there is a positive adjustment cost. However, it may 
be relatively small enough not to offset the recognized benefits of moving to a more securely 
based banking system that uses higher levels of equity capital. 
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APPENDIX  
Table of composed error specifications 
Schmidt-
Sickles (1984) 
fixed effects,  
Panel, time invariant LSDV 
fixed effects to measure 
inefficiency; can permit 
inefficiency and RHS variables 
to be correlated 
Shift frontier by maximal effect to 
measure efficiency 
 
Pitt-Lee 
(1981) time 
invariant  
Panel, time invariant MLE, 
normal and half normal errors 
Measure efficiency 
 
Battese-Coelli 
(1992) time 
varying 
 
Panel, time varying 
inefficiency same across all 
firms, MLE, normal and 
truncated normal errors 
Measure efficiency 
 
Reifschneider-
Stevenson 
(1991) 
Pooled, time varying 
inefficiency differs across all 
firms, MLE, normal and 
truncated normal errors with 
conditional heteroscedasticity 
Measure efficiency 
 
Seemingly 
unrelated 
system, 
SURE-CGLS 
Pooled, constrained system, 
time varying inefficiency, no 
distributional assumptions; 
estimate cost function and 
share equations together 
Shift frontier by minimum residual to 
measure efficiency 
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Countries where the sampled banking firms are located 
No. Country name  
Initial 
balanced 
sample 
Filtered 
sample 
Percentage 
remaining 
1 ARGENTINA 56 53 95 
2 BAHRAIN 24 24 100 
3 BELARUS 40 38 95 
4 BOLIVIA 32 28 88 
5 BRAZIL 188 106 56 
6 BULGARIA 48 44 92 
7 CHINA, PEOPLE'S 
REP. 56 52 93 
8 COSTA RICA 60 52 87 
9 CROATIA 68 67 99 
10 CZECH REPUBLIC 36 32 89 
11 GEORGIA, REP. OF 32 30 94 
12 GREECE 52 50 96 
13 HONG KONG 44 38 86 
14 HUNGARY 28 28 100 
15 INDIA 172 168 98 
16 INDONESIA 24 21 88 
17 ISRAEL 40 40 100 
18 JORDAN 40 40 100 
19 KOREA, REP. OF 60 60 100 
20 LATVIA 68 62 91 
21 LITHUANIA 24 22 92 
22 PERU 36 36 100 
23 PHILIPPINES 80 78 98 
24 POLAND 68 64 94 
25 ROMANIA 68 68 100 
26 SLOVAKIA 40 36 90 
27 SLOVENIA 48 48 100 
28 SOUTH AFRICA 32 30 94 
29 TAIWAN 52 51 98 
30 THAILAND 64 62 97 
31 TURKEY 48 48 100 
32 UKRAINE 104 104 100 
33 UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 44 44 100 
34 VENEZUELA 64 62 97 
 Total  1940 1786 92 
!
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Summary data on core variables before and after sample filtering 
 
$US million at year 2000 prices except where otherwise stated. 
! ! ! ! ! !
Variable 
Number in 
unfiltered 
sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loans 1940 89.886 339.618 0.00023 5272.13 
Securities 
and 
investments 
1940 40.2942 210.941 0 3657.23 
Off balance 
sheet income 
1940 57.2323 224.401 0 3342.2 
Total assets 1940 161.453 669.011 0.10855 11596.2 
Deposits and 
short-term 
funding 
1940 126.526 576.335 0.01764 10547.9 
Equity-asset 
ratio (%) 
1940 11.7296 8.70352 0.102 86.24 
 ! ! ! ! !
Variable 
Number in 
filtered 
sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loans 1786 90.5281 319.524 0.02592 4496.91 
Securities 
and 
investments 
1786 40.9041 201.873 0 3556.95 
Off balance 
sheet income 
1786 57.069 220.02 0 3342.2 
Total assets 1786 163.448 632.629 0.12586 9867.2 
Deposits and 
short-term 
funding 
1786 130.462 546.529 0.02517 8974.02 
Equity-asset 
ratio (%) 
1786 10.9743 7.56553 0.102 86.24 
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First order regression coefficients of cost function variables 
Variable/model Schmidt-
Sickles 
Pitt-Lee Battese-
Coelli 
Reifschneider-
Stevenson 
Core outputs, input prices, time and cost 
function constraint variables 
    
Loans 0.938*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.805*** 
Securities 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.145*** 
Off balance sheet 0.007** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 
Funding price 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 
Capital price 0.571*** 0.554*** 0.555*** 0.448*** 
Time 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.054*** 0.020*** 
Equity-asset ratio -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.044*** 
Z-variables used to condition the cost 
frontier or the inefficiency estimates 
    
Net loans/total assets -0.01422*** -0.01520*** -0.01460*** -0.00704 
Net loans/deposits and short-term funds -0.00339*** -0.00360*** -0.00380*** -0.07951*** 
Liquid assets/deposits and short-term 
funds 
-0.00066*** -0.00084*** -0.00070*** 0.01689*** 
Reserves for impaired loans/ non-
performing loans 
-0.00001 -0.00002*** -0.00001** -0.00003 
Non-interest expenses/gross revenues 0.00028 0.00033* 0.00034* -0.00114 
Non-performing loans/gross loans 0.00066 0.00049 0.00049 -0.00199 
Non-performing loans/gross loans 
relative to the average for the country 
0.00196 0.00333*** 0.00247* 0.11730*** 
Equity-asset ratio relative to the average 
for the country 
0.00384 0.00562*** 0.00335* 0.10639*** 
Per capita GDP growth rate -0.00036 0.00004 -0.00068 0.02777 
Mu  0.18958*** 0.17306***  
Eta   0.14049***  
Time    0.29306** 
Model statistics     
F value 2150.00    
chi-square 272000.00 262000.00 200000.00 
sigma_u 0.15 0.12 0.09 * conditional      
on z-variables   
above   
sigma_v 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.15 
* p<0.05  
** p<0.01  
*** p<0.001  
where p = probability-value significance level. 
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Estimated elasticity of scale at the sample mean 
Sample mean values in 
models 
Schmidt-
Sickles 
Pitt-Lee Battese-
Coelli 
Reifschneider-
Stevenson 
Panzar-Willig elasticity 
of scale 
1.053 1.033 1.033 1.034 
Adjusted elasticity of 
scale 
1.105 1.084 1.075 1.079 
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Total factor productivity change and its components for the whole sample 
Year Scale Allocative Technical  Capital 
constraint 
Efficiency Total factor 
productivity 
2005 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2006 1.003 1.020 0.991 0.987 0.994 0.994 
2007 1.003 1.012 0.979 0.999 0.999 0.992 
2008 1.001 1.033 0.964 1.004 1.007 1.007 
Mean 
over time 
1.002 1.016 0.983 0.997 1.000 0.998 
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Productivity change components by region 
TFP component Africa CA CEE ME SA SEA WE 
Scale efficiency change 1.003 1.007 1.011 1.004 1.008 1.003 1.009 
Allocative efficiency 
change 
1.042 1.043 1.032 1.004 1.035 1.022 1.042 
Technical change 0.972 0.981 0.975 0.983 0.991 0.977 0.970 
Constraint efficiency 
change 
1.006 1.000 1.001 0.996 1.000 0.997 1.008 
Technical efficiency 
change 
1.003 1.019 1.021 1.016 1.008 1.009 1.002 
        
Total factor productivity 
change 
1.025 1.065 1.039 1.000 1.041 1.005 1.029 
 
 
 
